Transcultural Politics as Deep Multiculturalism: Canada in Global Perspective

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Introduction

There exists no public policy in the world today that openly claims inspiration in a transculturalist approach. Instead, and following Canada's and then Australia's adoption of multiculturalist public policies during the 1970s, an increasing number of states have chosen multiculturalism, and in some cases, interculturalism, as an important policy frameworks for managing cultural diversity.[1]Indeed, ethno-cultural pluralism is far from limited to only those societies that have been major destinations for international immigration. It is, rather, a defining feature and a growing reality for most of the world's societies. As abundantly documented by the Minority Rights Group, no nation state among the United Nations' (UN) a hundred and ninety three members is entirely monocultural, mono-ethnic or even unilingual.[2] Certain states, for example, bring together several ethno-cultural groups, while in other situations ethno-cultural groups are dispersed within a supranational region divided among many states. Other groups are stateless, with no formal recognition of their existence, while

still others feel within them the pull of more than a single national loyalty, sensing attachment at times, and in unpredictable proportions, to both their original cultures and the cultures of their chosen country.

The fact that national boundaries have never, or rarely corresponded to the cultures they came to artificially circumscribe and separate, has all too often been obscured by the notion – broadly useful in state building – that something resembling a national culture exists in its own right. This is notwithstanding the case that such national cultures have had to be created institutionally through the careful efforts of the state. Such a vision has notably led us to accept the construct – since accepted as self-evident in current and common discourse – that 'cultures' are at once nationally circumscribed (contained within the borders of a state), and clearly and inescapably distinguishable from one another ('national cultures'). Yet it is clear that this is not always the case. National boundaries sometimes separate cultures that were once more united (one need think of the quasi states or failed states of Africa, for example), and presumably distinct 'cultures' cannot always be easily isolated from one another since they most often develop not in isolation but rather in in relation to, and sometimes in tension with one another. This occurs through migrations, conflicts, practices, loans and exchanges of goods, ideas or symbols – in short, through relationships. (One need only think here of the

Caribbean *Tout-monde* so vividly captured by Édouard Glissant in Glissant 1990; 1993; Glissant and Chamoiseau 2007).

At the turn of the nineteenth century the diffusionists of classical anthropology, including Grafton Elliott Smith (1919; 1933), and brilliantly updated by Franz Boas (1986 [1928]; 1940) presented concepts that went on to have considerable influence in the social sciences of the United States and elsewhere in the Americas in the 1920s.[3] Many scholars, including Bentley (1993) and Chanda (2007) have drawn attention to the importance of human migration and the diffusion of practices and representations in the history of contemporary societies, which have thus come to be viewed in terms of their respective interconnections. Indeed, at a time of accelerated flows of migration, cultural goods and ideas, it would seem to make increasingly less sense to continue emphasising narratives that stress the compartmentalisation of cultures between, or especially, within states. It is clear that an emphasis on the relationality of cultures is especially embraced by 'transculturalist' approaches that stress the ongoing networking and resonances among supposedly distinct cultures, not only at the national scale, but also internationally. (Benessaieh 2010a; 2010b; 2012; 2013; Benessaieh and Imbert 2010; 2011; Imbert 2004; 2010; 2012).

The main purpose of this chapter is to address several approaches to ethno-

cultural pluralism and then highlight how specific Canadian public institutions, in charge of promoting a sense of national culture, are in practice adopting policies of transcultural orientations that have the potential to undermine the traditional essentialist approaches to culture. In doing so, I will more specifically propose to better conceptually distinguish between the concepts of monoculturalism, interculturalism, multiculturalism, and transculturalismmonoculturalism. This will follow with an analysis of the ways in which two leading public organisations in the domain of cultural identity promotion, Canadian Heritage/Patrimoine canadien and Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC)/Radio-Canada, are defining their action.

Ethnic and Cultural Diversity in the World: An overview

The history and scope of multiculturalism in Canada, Australia, Sweden or Great Britain are well-documented in the literature (Banting, Courchene and Seidle 2007; Kymlicka 1995; 2003; 2009; Mann 2012; Murphy 2012; Thompson 2011) So too, more recently, are the interculturalist models that take a critical approach toward multiculturalist policies and instead emphasise the preservation of a reference culture in interaction with one or several cultures seen as threatening its continuity (the cases of Quebec, Belgium, Catalonia or the aboriginal peoples of the Americas are often cited as paradigmatic of this perspective, see Anctil 2011; Bouchard 2012; Cónil 2002; Labelle and Dionne 2011; Mato 2008). Also well-

known is a parallel body of literature that examines not the theoretical or practical possibilities of the state's management of ethno-cultural pluralism, but rather those notorious cases in which such pluralism has been greatly or partially reduced, or even more radically 'cleansed'. Examples of such can be observed in the genocides orchestrated by states, or political actors seeking to seize the state, in Rwanda, Bosnia and Nazi Germany (Chalk 1989; Chalk and Jonassohn 1990; Gurr 1994; Jonassohn 1993; Kuper 1981; Semelin 2005). Here again, transculturalist approaches are less well-known, as are their more strictly political – or, more precisely, their potentially political – dimensions.

I begin with a broad glance at current ethno-cultural diversity in the world. A mere overview at the information on ethnicity and other traits contained in the Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) profiles of countries and regions of security interest[4] demonstrates clearly that apart from the most internationally isolated cases of Korea (North and South), Japan and the Danish Faroe Islands – all of which have an atypically high rate of ethnic homogeneity (exceeding 95%)[5] – the overwhelming majority of national populations throughout the world are far more diverse than one might first expect. Some, including most small postcolonial societies in the Caribbean, the Pacific and the Americas, are highly 'mixed' (to use the CIA's terminology), with well over fifty per cent of their populations reporting more than a single ethno-cultural ancestry. This is the case, most

notably, on the Caribbean island of Aruba as well as in Madagascar, the Dominican Republic, Cape Verde (a historic slaving transhipment port) and Brazil, to name but a few examples.[6] Between these extremes of relative homogeneity and mixing, the vast majority of the world's societies feature an ethno-cultural landscape composed of one or two main groups, followed by a varied constellation of smaller communities either established long ago or having immigrated more recently.

What this data shows (among other things), is that there is significant ethnic and cultural diversity throughout the world, which, with the continuous growth of legal and irregular migratory flows, is not likely to diminish in the foreseeable future. Indeed, a review of figures published by the United Nations and the Program for International Migration and Multiculturalism of UNESCO (the United Nations Organization for Education, Science and Culture) reveals a marked acceleration of migration in absolute terms. Whereas the number of migrants worldwide was seventy five million in 1965, nearly fifty years later in 2013, that figure has tripled to two hundred and thrity-two million immigrants. Over the same period, the world's population had risen from three billion to seven billion inhabitants, expanding by a little more than double. Thus, while there has indeed been an absolute rise in the number of migrants worldwide, this statistic must be qualified by the fact that global population has also risen, with the

proportion of migrants to the world's total population not having shifted dramatically (at least not over the past fifty years). Thus, while it is correct to state that migratory flows have reached levels that are unprecedented in contemporary human history, it is also not incorrect to note that this phenomenon is not as new or numerically disproportionate as one might first believe.

In effect, while many authors emphasise the considerable importance of international migration today, one must nonetheless recall that immigrants constitute only 3 per cent of the world's population, which remains largely sedentary. Perceptions that migration is on its way to becoming a massive or uncontrollable phenomenon should therefore be challenged. Nonetheless, countries that are major recipients of international immigration such as Canada, the United States, Australia, the United Kingdom and Germany, all have among the lowest demographic growth rates in the world. Thus, the most dramatic changes in recent decades have not been caused by growing hordes of migrants moving throughout the world, but rather, much more simply, by the fact that the relative proportion of immigrants within the total population of certain host countries has risen, which has resulted in heightened political and social tensions.

This is precisely why it is so important for states to calibrate their policies for managing diversity. Such policies attempt to slow or filter flows at boundaries

(with Germany and the United States representing 'exemplary' cases of what Philippe Bourbeau in 2011 or Didier Bigo, in various essays in 2011 and 2012, refer to as 'securization'), while simultaneously setting out certain basic rules for peaceful coexistence within a population whose diversity can only be expected to increase in the foreseeable future (barring drastic reversals in current public policies – reversals and models which I will address later in this section in my discussion of 'exclusionary' models).

With these caveats in mind, it could be argued that international migratory flows are *capillarising* (with the five main countries of departure now being Mexico, China, Pakistan, India and Iran; a stark change from the mainly European migration that took place in the first half of the twentieth century). Likewise, the leading host societies for immigration – predominantly the United States, receiving twenty five per cent of international immigration, and then followed by Russia, Germany, and Canada (and then the European Union [EU] as a region) – are *diversifying* ever more (UN Population Division 2013). In sum, migrants not only have generally ceased to originate in the same part of the world, they also no longer move to the same destinations. This was previously the case for the New World, which, since its infamous 'discovery', had been the world's main destination for migrants.[7] Therefore, while one cannot state that migration is an exclusively contemporary phenomenon, notwithstanding an acceleration in

migratory flows observed by international organisations since the 1980s, the most noteworthy feature of these flows is that they have truly globalised. This shift makes the management of ethno-cultural diversity an issue of ever more international importance, and is evidenced by the acute interest shown for these issues by both the UN and UNESCO.

From Exclusionary Violence to Deep Multiculturalism: Four scripts

I shall now more closely examine differing approaches toward ethno-cultural pluralism in a national context. Based partly on the works of philosopher Wolfgang Welsch (1999) and the writer Édouard Glissant (1990; 1993; 2007) and inspired by the distinctively transdisciplinary writing of the semiologist and writer Patrick Imbert 2004; 2010; 2012), as well as by pioneering political scientist Will Kymlicka (1995; 2003; 2009), I have, in previous work, distinguished transculturalism from interculturalism and multiculturalism. I have proposed to define transculturality as a mode of drawing from several cultural repertoires; transculturalism can be considered a potential approach to treating culture in a non-essentialist and relational way, emphasising resonances and similarities between presumably distinct cultural frameworks (Benessaieh & Imbert 2010; 2011; Benessaieh 2008; 2010a; 2010b). Here I will consider four main approaches to public policy regarding ethno-cultural diversity. This is, of course, an ideal-type, to the extent that these models sometimes overlap; do not necessarily exist

in a pure state; and cannot be as easily distinguished from one another as might appear. The four main approaches I examine are monoculturalism, interculturalism, multiculturalism and transculturalism. For purposes of illustration, I will consider the case of Globalia, an imaginary country of undetermined location, which is grappling with four distinct types of situations or political-cultural models.

The first 'model', monoculturalism, which I define as *exclusionary,* is one which, whether in its democratic republican version or in its more absolutist form culminating ultimately in genocide, holds essentially that an ideal Globalian citizen participates in a culture, Globalian culture, which is disseminated and validated by the Globalian government. This 'culture' takes precedence over all other allegiances – religious, political, linguistic or ethnic –, which are considered secondary, or, in extreme cases, rival forces to the state, and therefore dangerous. The literature in genocide studies demonstrates rather clearly that genocide – or politicide in its less extreme forms – occurs when a given community or population is voluntarily and systematically defined as the 'other' or portrayed as foreign, and then dehumanised and annihilated on the sole basis of its difference from the community of perpetrators. This is, of course, the most extreme form of a monoculturalist policy. The well-argued works of Jacques Sémelin (2005), together with the pioneering studies of Leo Kuper (1981), Ted Gurr (1994) and

Canadians Frank Chalk and Kurt Jonassohn (Chalk 1989 Chalk & Jonassohn 1990; Jonassohn 1993) describe how such a rejection of the 'other' as foreign (or *extranéisation*, to borrow the expression of Jean-Louis Amselle [2008]) occurs from not only the point of view of the perpetrators but also that of the victims. While none of these theorists appear to link diversity with a propensity, or absence thereof, toward mass violence, it is prudent to suggest that for such mass rejections of the 'other' to occur, there must be at least two predominant groups or one majority and one minority group for which access to political and economic power is significantly disproportionate. Thus, while such mass violence does not appear to occur at all in more ethno-culturally heterogeneous (and democratic) societies, it is worth framing the question the opposite way: does a lower degree of diversity in a given society lead to a greater propensity toward monoculturalism and therefore greater odds that this society will adopt measures based on a mass rejection of the 'other'; from the most benign (for example, the state's refusal to confer citizenship on one of its subnational communities as is sadly the case of the Rohingyas in Burma) to the most violent, as in the cases mentioned above?

The second model, interculturalism, can be described as *differentialist* (or dualist). It occurs as a somewhat sophisticated form of monoculturalism or as an alternative to multiculturalism, of which it is often virulently critical. In Globalia,

a model of this type would mean that society would be divided into at least two groups or communities (ethnic, religious, linguistic or other). One of these communities, whether the majority or not, would establish itself as a reference point for identity, differentiated from all others, and its culture would be validated or embodied by the state. Other groups are then perceived in their exteriority, which sometimes takes shape in an explicitly nationalist discourse replete with references to 'others' and those who are 'not quite Globalian'. Further, the discourse continues that if this community adapt to what is done, and how things are done 'among us' they will become more Globalian. I have already identified two main variations on this model. The first resembles the previous model in its potential for exclusionism and violence. Illustrative examples of this form of interculturalism can be found in South Africa's experience of apartheid (1948-1991) or in black slavery in the Americas, in which whites and non-whites were institutionally separated by the highest possible racial wall, with whites accorded crushing predominance over non-whites in matters of political, economic and cultural power. The ethnic 'identity card' policies in Rwanda and, even more so, the genocide of Tutsis in 1963 and 1994 in Rwanda, also illustrate, even more radically, this exclusionist interculturalism. This finds expression in a discourse advocating the return to or maintenance of a communitarian unit reflecting the purity of a people's identity (a discourse and imagery highlighted by Sémelin [2005] in his comparative analysis of Rwanda, Bosnia and Nazi Germany). We

are dealing here, in other words, with a typically monoculturalist discourse that finds expression in an interculturalist framework.

In its second accepted meaning, the interculturalist model shifts away from monoculturalism and moves closer to multiculturalism. The emphasis is not on exclusion of the 'other' or an idealised return to a 'pure' identity. It is, rather, on the relationship between, on the one hand, the (majority or minority) reference group that enjoys validation and support from the state and, on the other hand, the other groups, which, to return to our hypothetical country, are indistinguishably labeled as 'neo-Globalians' or 'not quite Globalians'. In a democratic context, this form of interculturalism posits that ethno-cultural diversity should be managed to foster greater harmony by emphasising dialogue, understanding, or at least, tolerance between Globalians and neo-Globalians, while reiterating a central role for Globalian values, memory and culture, which are preserved and promoted nationwide. In the case of Quebec, I have already offered exhaustive analyses of the material submitted to the Bouchard-Taylor Commission's extraordinary public consultation led by historian Gérard Bouchard and philosopher Charles Taylor in 2007 and 2008 (Benessaieh & Imbert 2011; Benessaieh 2012; Bouchard and Taylor 2008; also Robin 2011). There are many examples of official interculturalism in the world, this very notion having arisen, as Micheline Labelle notes in her examination of these issues in the Quebec context (Labelle 2008;

Labelle & Dionne 2011), from the EU's integration process. Other writers have used the concept mainly to describe aboriginal issues (Mato 2008; UNESCO 2009). For several years, UNESCO has lent growing credence to this notion, sprinkling it abundantly throughout its annual reports and analysis documents (Benessaieh & Imbert 2011).

The third model of interest, multiculturalism, which I call *pluralist*, remains rather poorly understood outside of the societies that have adopted it as official public policy (such as Canada, Australia, Great Britain or Sweden). In Globalia, the multicultural model would see citizens conversing and moving about freely, each dressed for the occasion either in standard issue Globalian garb or in clothing highlighting their other-than-Globalian origins. In respect to this, however, and as Kymlicka argues in his recent paper (2010), multiculturalism is not merely a celebration of ethno-cultural diversity that allows citizens of post-industrial societies to taste pierogies, enjoy a Turkish bath, wear a ceremonial kimono or dance to Bangra music at home or elsewhere. While such increased diversity of cultural goods is indeed one aspect of multiculturalism, understanding it in this way is reductionist. Other highly influential critics, notably Neil Bissoondath (1994) in *Selling Illusions*, have argued that multiculturalist policies lead to cultural ghettoisation by encouraging minority communities to retreat to their ancient traditions and illiberal customs. For Bissoondath, this leads to tepid

coexistence, rather than true integration of recently arrived communities. Still others have suggested, particularly Yasmeen Abu-Laban and Christina Gabriel (2002) in *Selling Diversity*, that multiculturalism accentuates social isolation while not remediating to the political under-representation of communities drawn from immigration. This renders banal and depoliticises their cultural practices, which are kept alive outside of shared public space and merely tolerated since they are so rarely sought out. For Kymlicka, however, these criticisms represent an extreme caricature. What counts, he argues, is not so much the practice or pitfalls of multiculturalism, but much more importantly, that it is the only available political and theoretical model that reconciles democratic citizenship with fundamental human rights. As he puts it, 'multiculturalism is first and foremost about developing new models of democratic citizenship, grounded in human rights ideals, to replace earlier uncivil and undemocratic relations of hierarchy and exclusion' (Kymlicka 2010, p.101).

Transculturalism, the final model and which can be described as *relationalist*, echoes some aspects of the preceding models but criticises the way they conceive of culture and thus proposes an alternative. Indeed, the three previously described models all share a premise that cultures are separable, stable and impermeable to one another; a premise no doubt tied to the methodological nationalism vividly analysed by Ulrich Beck, Andréas Wimmer and Nina G. Schiller (Beck 2002;

2004a; 2004b; Wimmer 2009; Wimmer & Schiller 2002), which frames the world in terms of divisions and boundaries. By contrast, the transculturalist framework does not deny the existence of boundaries or distinctions between cultures, and pays greater attention to points of resonance, openings and mutual transformations arising from encounters and relations among culturally differentiated individuals and communities. It is a framework close to those of 'métissage', 'creolisation' or 'hybridisation' explored by cultural studies literatures, yet the terms 'transculturation' and 'transculturalism' are privileged because they keep visible the notion of 'culture' while terminologically contrasting with those of mono, inter or multiculturalism. In the continuum of 'models', transculturalism represents a dense or deepened version of multiculturalism which sets out conditions for pluralism and for harmonious social ties that are respectful of fundamental human rights values (such as gender equality, non-violence, civism and democracy, as noted by Kymlicka [2010]). It nonetheless continues to consider that cultures can be differentiated, declining to prescribe how. Beyond coexistence, ethno-cultural communities should engage in dialogue, and transform themselves or react to the new reference points that arise from these encounters. Under this model, a Globalian education system might put special emphasis on the acquisition of languages used domestically or elsewhere. History courses, for example, would not emphasise the memories or heritage of a homeland, but rather a collective imagining of the founding principles of the

country based on encounters among its citizens. Globalia's national museum, radio and television networks would likewise promote not a remembered past vaunting the merits of an original bygone entity, but rather a mobile, pluralist and moving present centred on the emergence of a collective ‘us’ oriented toward the future.

With these four scripts now having been outlined in the broadest possible terms, it should be stressed again that they have been distinguished from one another here for reasons of conceptual clarity. In reality, they sometimes overlap and hence cannot always clearly be differentiated (with the exception, of course, of the first and the last models, which are diametrically opposed to one another, both conceptually and practically). Having described these models as exclusionist, differentialist, pluralist and relationalist, I will now examine the Canadian case more closely to better delineate the approaches being discussed.

The Canadian Case: National identity in data and discourse

Canada is notable for its promotion of (explicitly multiculturalist) cultural pluralism rather than a national identity anchored in, or historically shared by, an exclusive or majority group. This pluralist, inclusive emphasis can be better understood when one considers that Canada, together with Australia, constitutes the world's most pluricultural society (that is, ethno-culturally diversified in

demographic terms). Alongside its aboriginal population (rarely visible in multiculturalism statistics), more than one-fifth of Canada's present day population is made up of immigrants[8] – people born outside the national territory – and that proportion grows when one considers the substantial number of Canadians of second, third and additional generations who are descendants of immigrants.[9] Within twenty years, authorities predict that Canada's populations of South Asian and Chinese origins will constitute the largest ethno-cultural minority groups in the country. By 2031, almost half (46%) of Canada's population will be able to trace its origins back to first or second generation immigration, and three out of every ten citizens will belong to visible minorities, according to figures from Citizenship and Immigration Canada (published in a study by Statistics Canada in Caron Malenfant, Lebel and Martel 2010). In absolute terms, this means at least seven to eight million people in total, the approximate equivalent of the present day population of Quebec or Paraguay, or more than six times the population of the cosmopolitan island nation of Trinidad and Tobago. It should be noted that this estimate is probably well below the true figure. If one were to include 'invisible minorities' such as children of second and further generations of immigrants, aboriginal people with or without their 'status', irregular immigrants and those awaiting some sort of formal status, as well as all the expatriates and globetrotters whose temporary stays can last many years, the total would most certainly be significantly higher.

CBC/Radio Canada and Canadian Heritage: Fostering national identity

In light of the size of Canada's ethno-cultural minority populations, there exists, alongside the work done by Citizenship and Immigration Canada in overseeing arrivals and departures, a dedicated government ministry. The Department of Canadian Heritage (known as PCH, for Patrimoine canadien/Canadian Heritage), is explicitly devoted to promoting Canadian 'national identity'. This department, which is mandated to promote and preserve national cultural diversity, acts in pursuit of these goals primarily through its own programmes and through the state broadcaster CBC/Radio-Canada.[10] Comprehensive analyses of policy shifts at Canadian Heritage, formed in 1936, and of programming trends at CBC/Radio-Canada since its inception in 1993 (which broadcasts content that is ninety nine per cent Canadian in a total of fifteen languages, including eight aboriginal languages, on a daily basis [CBC/Radio-Canada 2010]) have yet to be undertaken. Nonetheless, some key distinguishing features can be noted. Canadian Heritage defines its broad strategic orientations in these terms:

> We encourage a strong Canadian identity through active and engaged citizenship, and recognize that Canada is made stronger by its French- and English-language communities, Aboriginal communities, and the broader pluralistic communities. (Canadian Heritage 2013)

As for Radio-Canada, it asserts in its 2010-2015 strategic plan (CBC/Radio-Canada 2010) that it 'will continue to produce shows that contribute to the shaping of a shared national identity ... We will present a greater diversity of

voices on air and will do more to reflect the country's diversity in our programming ...'. What is noteworthy in these two mission statements are the recurring terms 'pluralism', 'communities' (in the plural), 'identity', and, of course, 'diversity'. Indeed, both statements are steeped in the discourse of official multiculturalism as articulated by political philosopher Kymlicka in his various published works (Kymlicka 1995; 2003; 2009; 2010). At first glance, then, Canadian policy appears firmly rooted within the pluralist model laid out in the previous section.

Yet beyond official discourse, a closer analysis of the way in which Canadian Heritage and Radio-Canada carry out their respective missions reveals that their practice of multiculturalism goes well beyond a simple cultivation of diversity or civic tolerance while respecting fundamental human rights. Indeed, such an examination reveals practices that are far removed from what critics such as Bissoondath have dismissed as the 'ghettoization'(1994) of the Canadian cultural landscape. Such critics contend that official multiculturalism policies encourage each cultural community to confine itself in its authenticity, its feathers, its language or drums, and thus to isolate itself socially and politically from the country's two main linguistic and cultural communities (Anglophone and francophone Canadians). Indeed, to take the case of Radio-Canada in Quebec and its longstanding policy of promoting Canadian artists and creators, it is apparent

that few performers of colour or with other-than-Québécois accents appear in its serialised television, variety or news shows.[11]

Yet, on the other hand, programmes on the French language network's three radio stations (Espace Musique 100.7 FM, Première Chaine 95.10 FM, and Radio Canada International, via satellite) have for years offered considerable prominence to Quebec hosts and artists of diverse origins, and to world music – be it Nova Scotia folk or Anglo-Saxon indie rock – that is not on heavy rotation at other Quebec outlets. This policy of culturally diverse broadcast content, one might say of deep pluralism, is central to the broadcaster's distinctive audio identity and is more in keeping with transculturalism than multiculturalism, to return to the four models discussed earlier. This is deep rooted pluralism, quite distinct from the vast multihued collage of compartmentalised content that a multiculturalist model might have offered. What is presented is a dynamic, synergistic relationship among cultural productions drawing on a variety of traditions and musical styles from around the world and the outcome is a representation of Canadian cultural identity seen in its many facets.

I will now examine the case of Canadian Heritage (PCH), the department responsible for promoting Canadian identity. PCH oversees five departmental bodies including the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications

Commission, along with an administrative tribunal for the export of cultural goods and ten state corporations including the Canada Council for the Arts. Among PCH's main responsibilities are the implementation of multiculturalism legislation through the financing and promotion of arts and culture related activities. Other topics for which it has responsibility include material and immaterial heritage, cultural diversity rights (including the rights of aboriginal people and women), official languages, commemorations and celebrations, and sports. Policies supporting immigrant origin communities' cultural and artistic activities appear to be PCH's main area of involvement in the promotion of diversity and of a vision of multiculturalism. Yet as in the case of CBC/Radio-Canada – and contrary to the claims of multiculturalism's detractors – it appears that PCH's action cannot be reduced merely to encouraging communities to continue emphasising their ancestral or heritage practices. Indeed, an examination of the department's activities in this area suggests that the projects it supports do not, as its critics contend, keep communities separated from one another and thus from Canada's two official languages and cultures; these communities are not structurally ostracised by a multiculturalist regime which, as critics would have it, aims precisely to isolate them from diversity and difference by emphasising their solitariness and specificity.

On the contrary, as Marie McAndrew, Denise Helly and Caroline Tessier (2005)

note, PCH's work supporting festivals and cultural events, for example, has substantially changed over the past thirty years. PCH has gradually cast aside its previous approach, which once helped mono-ethnic communities to carry out their cultural and artistic projects separately. For example, previously Senegalese or Egyptian origin citizens were encouraged to hold separate Senegalese or Egyptian activities at an event, and old stock Quebecers likewise were provided with financial assistance to hold their own parties. PCH's more recent approach, which needs further investigation through detailed fieldwork, no longer favours such initiatives. It instead encourages cultural and artistic projects that can demonstrate that they are the outcome of a federation or alliance or, at the very least, an interaction among many ethno-cultural groups. What is being espoused here? In McAndrew, Helly and Tessier's (2005) comprehensive study of the shifts in financing of ethno-cultural organizations by PCH the following two key facts are noted:

> We note, first, a significant expansion of multiethnic entities that has come, for all intents and purposes, at the expense of mono-ethnic organizations. From 1983 to 2002, their respective share [of PCH financing] went from 41.2% to 56.0% and from 36.0% to 17.7%, … We also note, as one might expect, that among mono-ethnic organizations, those serving European-origin populations have seen a drastic decline [in financing], while organizations that have arisen within visible minority groups or which bring together specific communities defined by a broader marker than just ethnic origin have held on to their gains, despite the over-all decline in this category. (McAndrew, Helly & Tessier 2005, p.12)

The study also notes many underlying trends that are still in effect today. These were first observed in the 1990s, even though PCH's total budget stagnated over

that decade (despite a major inflow of new immigrants) and notably, this budget has been, more recently, drastically reduced after the Conservatives' rise to power in 2006 (they still hold office in late 2013, at the time of editing this chapter for publication). These underlying trends are: a major increase in PCH's financing of cultural organisations involved in anti-racism work; a substantial expansion of initiatives for institutional adaptation and the fostering of understanding between minority and majority cultures; a significant drop in support for integration projects and those encouraging minorities to participate in their (mono-ethnic) associations; and, finally, the virtual disappearance of support for initiatives to support minority languages and cultures.

What should one conclude from these enlightening findings? First, that the claim regarding Canadian multicultural initiatives promoting the ghettoisation of ethno-cultural communities is broadly contradicted by the type of projects and recipients that PCH supports. With a sharp decline in funding for monocultural organisations' initiatives and a rise in financing for projects originating in more pluricultural entities, communities have been, ‘more than ever, encouraged to make contact with all other groups on the one hand, and, to interact with society as a whole, on the other’ (McAndrew, Helly & Tessier 2005, p.20). Second, criticism to the effect that multiculturalism policy seeks to encourage minority communities' folklore or ancestral practices is also broadly contradicted. This can

be argued because of the major decline in funding for minority languages and cultures, to the benefit of broader or more socially oriented projects seeking improved understanding among minority cultures, especially between these cultures and the majority cultures of English and French Canada.

Thus, in terms of the previously discussed conceptual framework, it is clear in the cases of state broadcaster CBC/Radio Canada and the Canadian Heritage department (PCH) that: (1) they are not involved in promoting exclusionist monoculturalism; (2) differentialist interculturalism is hardly in evidence here either; (3) numerous references are made to pluralist multiculturalism; and (4) this is nonetheless intended to foster integration as well as relational and potentially synergistic goals, all of which are more broadly in keeping with the transculturalist approach that I have defined above. This fourth approach must not be understood as being in radical opposition to the three previous models. It is conceptually (or, more precisely, epistemologically) distinct by virtue of being at odds with the other models because it is anchored in a relational and dynamic understanding of culture; it can be considered an offshoot of the multiculturalist model which it deepens and densifies in prescriptive and practical directions. It is no longer a simple presentation of diversity, but rather entering into a relationship with it (hence my use of the term ‘deep multiculturalism’). Indeed, this fourth model proposes such an approach because what is at issue is not the cultivation of

folklore or the encouragement of isolated practices that allow each minority group to flourish at the margins of broader society. Only more advanced fieldwork involving in-depth interviews with key actors in the senior civil service, cultural agencies and nongovernmental and ethno-cultural organisations, together with a documentary review of specialised reports and briefs detailing the main elements of multiculturalism policy developed since 1971, would allow a more nuanced analysis than we have here. This would enable better understanding of the range of transculturalist oriented concepts and practices that I have canvassed.

Conclusion: Transcultural politics?

I conceive of politics in a much broader sense than the simple exercise of power by the state and its constituent parts. Politics is also expressed through everyday events that go beyond the exercise of government power, including all relationships between individuals, communities and organisations, including cultural or identity-based relationships. In conclusion, I offer a brief comparative synthesis through returning to the case of Globalia. In a monoculturalist Globalia, the power relationship between those in the cultural or ethnic majority and those more identified with minorities would be one of dominance or even violence aimed at establishing and maintaining this dominant position within a pluralism reduced to its most simple expression. In an interculturalist Globalia, the balance of power could shift toward a pattern of strikes and counter strikes between two

groups challenging one another for access to power, legitimised cultural status and government recognition. It could also produce a more benign form of tension between a majority group celebrating their heritage or language, but which is underpinned by their representation of others not belonging to the group as foreign. For the state, this would result in a validation of the majority group while concurrently attempting, within a democratic context, to acknowledge a role for minorities. In a multiculturalist Globalia the balance of power would be distributed among many groups with state recognition so that there was little or no officially recognized dominant or majority status. This would facilitate a pluralist framework, within which all communities and individuals could participate. Moreover, all groups would be represented politically. This is reflected in the Canadian example which supports a non-ethnic, non-identity based perspective, that is, one favouring integration in democratic citizenship that promotes the idea of 'us' in all its diversity (rather than an exclusionary uniqueness as can sometimes be seen in the previous models). Finally, in transculturalist Globalia, which strives for a thicker form of multiculturalism (a deep multiculturalism), the state would withdraw from any attempt at symbolic representation of those cultural groups present, not even necessarily recognising their heritage or identity markers as needing expression in the public realm. Rather, it would encourage the continuing creation of relationships between apparently different groups, and on the fluctuating, lively and unpredictable emergence of composite and shifting

cultural identities as an outcome of the encounters and mutual transformation of those involved. The Globalian museum or public radio network would therefore be instructed not to validate one culture or another, or to legitimise one type of folklore or heritage over all others, but instead to encourage practices aimed at constructing – from scratch, if necessary – identity based, cultural and artistic representations. This would ideally reflect a shifting reality, in which cultures are based on an 'us'; an 'us' that is open ended, and continually created, encountered and recreated.

Such a fluctuating collective identity is more consistent with the image of rhizomes than of roots – a concept developed incisively by Glissant (1990; 1993), based on the work of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari (1976; 1980). These concepts posit that rhizomatic identities are sustained by their mutual entanglement in an ecology of coevolution and organic (or plant-like) coadaptation. Root-like identities, on the other hand, smother their surroundings in a manner more akin to that of animal predators. In the final analysis, such a framework calls for a critical rethinking about notions of national identity, boundaries and the separability of cultures. A reconceptualisation would facilitate a better grasp of the resonances and relationships between groups that still appear to many observers to be inevitably different, in rivalry or even, at times, dangerous.

Notes

[1] A Multiculturalism Policy Index (MCP Index) recently developed by political scientists Will Kymlicka and Keith Banting at Queen's University evaluates, in 21 Western democracies, the evolution of multiculturalism policies through indicators on state-minority relations, and over the last 30 years. They find that 'despite the perception of a backlash and retreat from immigrant multiculturalism, the evidence suggests that multiculturalism policies have persisted, and in many cases, continue to expand', at http://www.queensu.ca/mcp/index.html (accessed November 25 2013)

[2] Established since the late 70s, with consltative status with the United Nations, the MRG is an international non-governmental network documenting and monitoring the status of minoritie and indigenous people in the world : http://www.minorityrights.org/3/home/mrg-directory-homepage.html (accessed November 25, 2013).

[3] Although the extent of his personal relationships with the Latin American intellectuals who developed the founding notions of racial mixing and transculturation remains unclear, we nonetheless know that Boas taught Manuel Gamio (1883-1960), who went on to found Mexico's National Indigenist Institute (1948). Boas was of the same generation as Fernando Ortiz (1881-1969), José Vasconcelos (1882-1859) and Oswald de Andrade (1890-1954), each of whom had a major influence over the nascent literature on racial and cultural mixing in the Americas. Here, Ortiz and Andrade are referenced, but the others are not. About Boas' influence on Latin American scholars and intellectuals, see Benessaieh (2013).

[4] Since 1962, following the creation of the CIA in the immediate post-war period (1947), the agency's *World Factbook* has provided an annual and surprisingly detailed (albeit at times rather general) description of each country in the world order according to the following criteria (by order of appearance in each profile): history, geography, society, peoples (ethnic, cultural, religious, demographic and migratory traits), sectors of economic activity, media, military strength and transnational issues (that is, border disputes with neighbouring countries, the presence of refugees and displaced people within a country's boundaries or the presence of human trafficking). See https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2075.html#ca accessed 25November, 2013.

[5] Even when the CIA Worldbook (2012 edition, the most recent one available online) indicates such high rates of ethnic homogeneity, one can infer that these are statistical or technical generalisations that merit closer examination. For example, Iceland, well-known for its high level of racial and ethnic homogeneity, is described in this publication as an 'homogeneous mixture of descendants of Norses and Celts 94%, populations of foreign origins 6%.' What is striking here is the juxtaposition of the terms 'mixture' and 'homogeneous', which begs the question: how can a people be at once mixed or misceginated and at the same time homogeneous? Unless what is being suggested here is that this presumed homogeneity (whether ethnic, racial or cultural) is most often merely the result of many types of mixing that have occurred over a long period.

[6] The *Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística* (Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics) states, based on Brazil's 1990 census, that its national population is forty per cent white, fifty per cent mixed race, eight per cent black and two per cent composed of other minorities including aboriginal peoples, with more than a hundred types of physiological traits existing beyond these initial categories, including mixed-race people such as *Caboclo* or *Mameluco* (a mix of white and aboriginal), *Mulato* (mixed white and black) and *Cafuzo* (a mix of aboriginal and black).

[7] In his inspiring essays on racial mixing and syncretisms as founding dynamics of the New World, Grunzinski (1999) describes the settling of the Americas in three great waves which essentially took place in the fifteenth and nineteenth centuries and in the 1920s and 1930s. These waves originated essentially in Europe and to a lesser degree in China, India and Africa.

[8] According to Simon (2008) using the UN's data, twenty per cent of Canadian and Australian populations are immigrants. Together, they are hosting up to twenty per cent of the world's immigration flows.

[9] Based on data from Statistics Canada, there are over two hundred languages spoken in the country. After English and French, by order of declining importance these are Chinese, Italian, German, Punjabi, Arabic, Urdu and Tagaloq (Caron Malenfant, Lebel and Martel 2010).

[10] Beyond the two entities mentioned here, the Heritage Department is also responsible for the following services, entities, corporations and agencies: Bodies providing *special services* including the Canadian Conservation Institute and the Canadian Heritage Information Network; *ministerial bodies* including Library and Archives Canada, the National Battlefields Commission, Status of Women Canada, the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission and the National Film Board of Canada; *state corporations* including the National Arts Centre, the Canada Council for the Arts, the Canadian Museum of Nature, the Canadian Museum of Immigration at Pier 21, the Canadian Museum for Human Rights, the National Gallery of Canada, the Museum of Civilization Corporation, the Canada Science and Technology Museums Corporation, the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation and Telefilm Canada, an administrative tribunal, the Canadian Cultural Property Export Review Board; and, finally, four *human resources bodies* that report to Parliament through the Heritage Department: the Public Service Commission, the Public Service Labour Relations Board, the Public Service Staffing Tribunal and the Public Servants Disclosure Protection Tribunal. This information was found on the PCH website at http://www.pch.gc.ca/eng/1266433674232/1266389969960
Accessed 25 November, 2013.

[11] BBM, a non-profit entity operating since 1944, regularly publishes survey data on the popularity of television shows in Canada and Quebec as well as radio broadcast ratings (data available at http://www.bbm.ca/en). Their surveys reveal that in 2011 the shows 'Tout le monde en parle' and 'Les enfants de la télé', whose ethnocultural profiles are both far more homogeneous than truly diverse, were among the ten most watched shows in the province. The shows 'Star académie' and 'Occupation double' on the TVA network (a Quebec chain where visible ethnic diversity is hardly prominent, at least not yet) beat Radio-Canada in the ratings contest.

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